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When in Rome: Analyzing the Local Law and Custom 
Provision of the Foreign Claims Act 
Christopher V. Daming  
On an early September morning in Afghanistan, a twelve-
thousand-pound M1114 Up-Armored High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicle (―Humvee‖) barreled down a dirt road through the 
city of Khost, a large cloud of dust following close behind.
1
 The 
Humvee led a convoy of four vehicles and was patrolling Khost to 
prevent possible Taliban attacks against intimidated voters on this 
election day. The driver of the lead vehicle intentionally drove at a 
dangerously fast speed down the narrow road. He remembered the 
convoy commander specifically telling him that ―speed is our friend‖; 
moving quickly was the best way to avoid ambushes.  
Suddenly, the gunner on the lead vehicle pointed toward the 
ground to the left of the road, but the convoy continued moving 
without investigating the object. The second vehicle assumed the lead 
gunner had not pointed toward anything dangerous like an 
improvised explosive device; otherwise, something would have been 
said over the radio. The driver of the second vehicle continued on, 
only to feel a slight bump and hear what he thought was a yelp as the 
convoy traveled down the road. 
Two days later Shabbir Khan, a Khost resident, arrived at the U.S. 
military‘s Forward Operating Base Salerno and requested to speak 
with claims personnel. Shabbir brought Polaroid pictures of a 
deceased Labrador and alleged through an interpreter that two days 
prior, a ―big tan American truck‖ ran over Zemar, his family dog and 
 
 
 
J.D. Candidate (2012), Washington University School of Law; B.A. History (2009), 
DePaul University; former legal specialist in the 82nd Airborne Division and tenant of Khost, 
Afghanistan from 2005–2006. I would like to thank my parents, Ken and Kathy Daming, and 
Lauren, for their love, advice, and encouragement during the preparation of this Note and 
throughout my life. Also, I‘d like to thank the Army JAGs I spoke with who provided 
invaluable guidance on this topic.  
 1. This story is a hypothetical scenario. 
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protector of his house. After an investigation found that Shabbir‘s 
story was true, a U.S. claims commissioner unfamiliar with Afghani 
custom concluded that the cost of a similar dog from this region 
would cost USD $35 at the local market. He paid Shabbir the 
equivalent sum in Afghani, the Afghanistan currency.  
The payment infuriated Shabbir; he complained that the sum was 
paltry and insulting and that it violated the custom of his people. 
Shabbir explained that if someone from his tribe had killed his dog, 
that tribesman would have, in accordance with their local custom, 
reimbursed him with a sheep as well as additional money.
2
 After 
failing to convince the claims commissioner to increase his 
reimbursement, Shabbir, faced with the realization that he had no 
other options, accepted the money but swore to tell other members of 
his tribe about the injustice that the United States committed against 
him.
3
 Shabbir returned to his village and told his tribal elder about the 
United States‘ actions, causing the tribal elder to decide that his tribe 
would no longer help the United States in its war against the Taliban.
4
  
 
 2. See INT‘L LEGAL FOUND., THE CUSTOMARY LAWS OF AFGHANISTAN 18 (2004), 
available at http://www.theilf.org/reports-ilfa-customary-laws.pdf. This report, created by the 
International Legal Foundation, has a section discussing the customary laws of the southern and 
eastern provinces in Afghanistan that outlines the specific guidelines for reimbursement when a 
person accidentally kills someone‘s dog. Id. The report states that the person who committed 
the act must ―give the owner a sheep and a specified amount of money.‖ Id. Furthermore, the 
report explains the significance of dogs: ―[W]hile killing a dog is not considered the equivalent 
of killing a human, dogs symbolize the protection of a house and its boundaries; therefore, 
killing a dog is regarded as a serious insult requiring harsh punishment.‖ Id.  
 3. There is a very limited appeals process under the Foreign Claims Act (FCA), which is 
the applicable law for this hypothetical scenario. U.S. DEP‘T OF THE ARMY, ARMY 
REGULATION 27-20, CLAIMS 54-55 (2008), available at http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/ 
R27_20.pdf [hereinafter AR 27-20]. Once a claim is paid, the action is considered ―final and 
conclusive.‖ 10 U.S.C. § 2735 (2006). 
 4. Villages that have good relationships with the United States can be beneficial in 
multiple ways. First, the village may help the United States stop insurgent attacks. Tom A. 
Peter, US Deal with Afghan Tribe Promises to Reduce Taliban Strikes, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-South-Central/2011/ 
0104/US-deal-with-Afghan-tribe-promises-to-reduce-Taliban-strikes. For example, one village 
in Afghanistan made an agreement with the United States that, in exchange for the release of a 
local Taliban member, the village would prevent Taliban attacks and prevent foreign militants 
from being in the region. Id.  
 Second, some villages that maintain good relations with the United States provide much 
needed inside intelligence. Betsy Hiel, One Village at a Time, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE REVIEW 
(July 2, 2008), http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/specialreports/trib-in-
afghanistan/s_575503.html. For example, in 2008, soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division 
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* * * * * 
Toward the end of World War I, General John J. Pershing, the 
leader of the American Expeditionary Force, sent a telegram to the 
U.S. Congress requesting legislation that would allow the U.S. 
military to pay for injuries and damages that it inflicted upon French 
civilians and their property.
5
 From this request, and after several 
amendments spanning nearly fifty years, the Foreign Claims Act 
(FCA) was created.
6
  
The FCA‘s purpose is to ―promote and maintain friendly 
relations‖ between the U.S. armed forces and host nations through 
timely payment of meritorious foreign claims.
7
 The FCA permits the 
 
met with a village elder in the Narizah village, which is located in the province of Khost (the 
same province as this hypothetical scenario). Id. The village was suspected of catering to the 
Taliban. Id. Consequently, the unit desired to gather intelligence about the Taliban from the 
village. Id. In explaining why he appreciates the United States and why he is willing to aid the 
United States‘ mission, Hakim Wali, the village elder of Narizah, stated, ―We really appreciate 
that you are here for us. . . . You cooperate with us, and we will cooperate with our own 
government to make it better.‖ Id. A U.S. soldier responded, ―We understand that we [the 
United States] are your guests. . . . We need to follow the laws of your cultures.‖ Id. Wali then 
explained how important it is for the United States to adhere to the Afghan culture: ―By doing 
that, respecting our culture and tradition . . . if you do good things for the Pashtun people, they 
will never forget you.‖ Id.  
 Finally, villagers sometimes reveal to U.S. soldiers the location of improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs). Fear of Taliban Keeps Villagers from Reporting IEDs, SOUTH ASIAN MEDIA 
NET (Jan. 7, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.mediawitty.com/test/NewsDetail.aspx?group_id= 
43&id=12917&folder_id=250&Page_Title=Fear%20of%20Taliban%20keeps%20villagers%20
from%20reporting%20IEDs. This information is invaluable considering that the number one 
cause of U.S. deaths in both Iraq and Afghanistan is from IEDs. Tim Reese, Searching for IEDs 
in Afghanistan, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (July 9, 2010, 9:41 AM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/ 
photos/2010/07/searching-for-ied-in-afghanist.html; Clay Wilson, Improvised Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures, FEDERATION OF 
AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (Aug. 28, 2007), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22330.pdf.  
 5. S. REP. NO. 65-379 (1918). 
 6. See 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2006). The FCA provides in relevant part:  
To promote and to maintain friendly relations through the prompt settlement of 
meritorious claims, the Secretary concerned . . . may appoint, under such regulations 
as the Secretary may prescribe, one or more claims commissions . . . to settle and pay 
in an amount not more than $100,000, a claim against the United States for damage to 
or loss of [real property, personal property, or personal injury to a foreign country or 
inhabitant of a foreign country]. 
Id.  
 7. Id. Furthermore, the FCA is intended to provide a stabilizing effect in regions where 
the citizens feel as though all of their rights are disregarded. REPORT OF THE GEN. BD., U.S. 
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United States to pay noncombat-related
8
 claims brought by 
inhabitants of foreign countries for damage that U.S. soldiers inflict 
on the inhabitants‘ person or property.9  
One provision of the FCA, the local law and custom provision, 
requires that the claims commissioner—the person charged with 
adjudicating a foreign claim—adjudicate the claim in accord with the 
local law and custom of the country from which the claim 
originates.
10
 This important provision is aligned with the current U.S. 
war strategy—the counterinsurgency doctrine—that was 
implemented in Iraq and is currently employed in Afghanistan.
11
 As 
opposed to the old theory of U.S. warfare, the counterinsurgency 
doctrine places a new emphasis on understanding and adhering to the 
local culture.
12
 Accordingly, if a claims commissioner does not 
properly understand and apply the local law and custom provision to 
the claim, then his actions are at odds with the FCA‘s purpose as well 
as with U.S. war strategy.
13
 
The problem is that the U.S. military has no universal system that 
dictates how claims commissioners should first identify the local law 
and then apply it to the foreign claim.
14
 Rather, most claims 
commissioners attempt to comply with the provision by creating ad 
hoc programs, usually with minimal confidence.
15
 This Note explores 
 
FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER, LEGAL QUESTIONS ARISING IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS 26 
(1945), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/eto/eto-087.pdf. By paying meritorious 
claims, claims personnel are able to ―not only pleas[e] the individual directly involved but [also 
make] him an agent of goodwill for the United States among his neighbors.‖ Id. 
 8. See infra notes 84–86 for further discussion of what constitutes ―noncombat.‖ 
 9. See 10 U.S.C. § 2734. 
 10. 32 C.F.R. § 536.139 (2006). 
 11. Dexter Filkins & John F. Burns, Mock Iraqi Villages in Mojave Prepare Troops for 
Battle, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/01/world/americas/01 
insurgency.html; see also discussion infra Part I.E; President Obama’s Remarks on New 
Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/03/27/us/politics/27obama-text.html?pagewanted=1. 
 12. See U.S. DEP‘T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY 1-24, 6-9, 
B-7, D-8 (2006), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FM_3-24.pdf 
[hereinafter FM 3-24]. 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. See THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.‘S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL 
LAW HANDBOOK 316 (2010), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/ 
operational-law-handbook_2010.pdf [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK]. 
 15. See CTR. FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.‘S 
LEGAL CTR. & SCH., I LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, MAJOR 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/10
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that problem and offers two solutions based on the type of country in 
which the claim arose: one for nations with several types of legal 
systems divided by regions and one for nations with more uniform 
legal systems. Both solutions provide a framework to produce a 
uniform system that will ensure that claims commissioners 
understand the local law and custom and can therefore apply the 
proper remedy when adjudicating claims. 
Part I of this Note begins with the legislative history of the FCA, 
from its inception to its modern-day meaning and application. It then 
briefly explains the FCA‘s relation to the counterinsurgency doctrine, 
while providing a basic background of the doctrine itself. Part II 
investigates the problems with the FCA‘s application and explains 
the importance of a new system, particularly given the complexities 
and potential for mistakes in the current system. Finally, Part III 
offers two solutions intended to help resolve the problems associated 
with today‘s application of the FCA.  
I. A HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN CLAIMS ACT 
A. The Foundation is Laid for the Foreign Claims Act: World War I 
The need for FCA-type legislation first arose during World War 
I.
16
 The original legislation, the foundation for the later-codified 
FCA, was titled ―An Act to give indemnity for damages caused by 
American forces abroad‖ (―Indemnity Act‖)17 and was signed into 
 
COMBAT OPERATIONS 186–7 (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/clamo-
v1.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL LESSONS VOL. I]. 
 16. See Act to Give Indemnity for Damages Caused by American Forces Abroad, ch. 57, 
Pub. L. No. 65-133, 40 Stat. 532 (1918) [hereinafter Indemnity Act], repealed by Act of Apr. 
22, 1943, 57 Stat. 66, § 5 (1943); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
 17. Indemnity Act, Pub. L. No. 65-133, 40 Stat. 532. The Indemnity Act stated in relevant 
part, 
That claims of inhabitants of France or of any other European country not an enemy or 
ally of any enemy for damages caused by American military forces may be presented 
to any officer designated by the President, and when approved by such an officer shall 
be paid under regulations made by the Secretary of War.  
Sec. 2. That claims under this statute shall not be approved unless they would be 
payable according to the law or practice governing the military forces of the 
country in which they occur. 
Id. 
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law by President Woodrow Wilson on April 18, 1918.
18
 The 
Indemnity Act was intended to provide reimbursement to Europeans 
for damages inflicted by American forces.
19
 In adjudicating a claim, 
the Indemnity Act instructed claims commissioners to adopt the same 
law of the country in which the damages occurred.
20
 For example, if a 
U.S. soldier damaged someone‘s property in France, then the claims 
commissioner would use French law—as opposed to American law—
to determine whether the U.S. soldier was negligent in causing the 
damages.
21
 
Although primarily intended to address issues in France, Congress 
resisted confining the language of the Indemnity Act to apply only to 
damages caused in that country.
22
 While one congressman proposed 
more narrow language for the statute,
23
 Congress ultimately decided 
 
 18. Id. Additionally, the Indemnity Act had overwhelming support from Congress and its 
committees. H.R. REP. NO. 65-341, at 2 (1918). For example, the Committee on Military Affairs 
from the House of Representatives approved the bill unanimously. Id. A major reason for its 
popularity was Congress‘s concern that the United States‘s reputation was being damaged 
among French civilians because the military would not reimburse the French for injuries it had 
caused to a French citizen‘s property. Id. Accordingly, Congress found that the act could help 
remedy this issue. See id.  
 This lack of a claims system was especially embarrassing for the United States when 
compared to the British, who already had a claims system in place. S. REP. NO. 65-379, at 2 
(1918). General Pershing elaborated on this in a Senate Report: The ―[i]nability to pay claims 
for injuries due to accidents caused by Government motor vehicles and other causes result in 
much hardship and injustice to French people and seriously injures [the reputation of the 
American Army in France] as compared with the British.‖ Id.  
 19. Indemnity Act, 40 Stat. 532. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id.  
 22. See id. Congressman Little of the U.S. House of Representatives worried that the 
language was left too broad, and he was particularly concerned about officers paying out any 
claims to German citizens. 56 CONG. REC. 4801 (1918). In insisting that the U.S. Congress 
write the language correctly, he noted that ―you should draw it so that it says what we mean and 
means what we say, so that such criticisms would not arise.‖ Id. at 4802. Little feared that, 
without correcting the language, Congress was essentially authorizing American military 
officers to commit treason by giving them power to pay claims to German citizens. Id. From 
this discussion, the House of Representatives agreed to include language that only allowed 
payment of claims to ―France or of any other European country not an enemy or ally of an 
enemy for damages caused by American military forces.‖ Id. at 4801–05 (emphasis added).  
 23. Congressman Miller questioned the necessity of making the bill so sweeping. Id. at 
4800. He proposed narrowing the bill‘s language to only cover claims that arose from 
nonmission-related troop maneuvers that occurred within the French borders. Id. 
 Congressman Kahn responded to this with an anecdote to show Congressman Miller that 
his proposed language was not broad enough. Id. at 4800–01. He explained, ―An officer is 
instructed to carry a dispatch to a certain place. He is not engaged in maneuvers. He starts off in 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol39/iss1/10
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to give the officers and regulation-writers broad discretion with only 
one serious caveat: officers were not to pay claims derived from 
combat-related scenarios.
24
  
The importance of incorporating the law or practice of the host 
nation (i.e., the current local law and custom provision) into the 
adjudication process was also heavily debated.
25
 General Pershing 
was the first person to initiate this discussion.
26
 In a telegram dated 
January 17, 1918, Pershing cabled, ―Proposed legislation designed to 
authorize prompt settlement of the claims of inhabitants that would 
be paid by French government under French laws if resulting from 
acts of French forces.‖27 The House of Representatives expressed 
satisfaction with General Pershing‘s suggestion.28 Congressman 
Green, for example, noted his approval: ―[I]f the forces in France 
were operating in this country, we would not want our laws to be 
abrogated. We would want compensation to be paid in accordance 
with our law, and that is what the French want, and that is what they 
ought to have.‖29 To Congressman Green, the provision was so 
 
an automobile, and going down the road at a fast rate on a dark night he runs over a pig 
belonging to a French peasant.‖ Id. at 4800. He then asked Miller whether the French peasant 
should be reimbursed for this, to which Miller agreed. Id.  
 Both congressmen concluded that it is best to not limit statutory language too much; rather, 
some discretion should be left to the ―judgment of our officers on the other side [of the 
Atlantic], who are dealing with the inhabitants day after day.‖ Id. at 4801. 
 24. See id. at 4799–4803. In the discussion regarding the exclusion of combat-related 
scenarios, one congressman noted matter-of-factly that the bill was not ―intended to permit a 
person having, for instance, a residence, along the battle front, which has been blown up, to 
recover damages.‖ Id. at 4799; see also infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.  
 25. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 65-379, at 1–2 (1918). 
 26. Id. at 2. General Pershing, through his first-hand familiarity with the importance of 
having some type of claims‘ adjudication system, advocated strongly for the Indemnity Act. Id.  
 27. Id. Pershing added, ―We avail ourselves of French laws to quarter our troops in homes 
of their people, and should therefore conform to the French laws in our relation to them as 
nearly as practicable.‖ Id. 
 28. See 56 CONG. REC. 4801.  
 29. Id. Congressman Green was adamant about approving the local law provision. Id. He 
pointed out that this was not an issue that the United States could ―afford to be otherwise than 
liberal‖ on. Id. Moreover, he was wary about adding obstacles to applying the law of France to 
the claims for situations that arose in France: ―We cannot afford to stick on small things when 
the law of France gives some compensation. We ought to be willing to give the same 
compensation to the people of that country that their own laws give to them. That limits and 
prescribes exactly what shall be paid.‖ Id. Green continued his explanation by noting that the 
British were already conducting this claims operation:  
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important that even if the statute‘s language did go a ―little beyond 
what we would consider proper in this country, it seems to me that 
we can under no circumstances afford to have any difficulty or bad 
feeling created . . . between the inhabitants of France and other 
friendly countries where [the United States‘] troops may be 
operating.‖30 After this discussion, the bill, which included a 
provision that required local law to be applied to claim adjudication, 
passed.
31
 President Wilson signed the Indemnity Act into law 
approximately two months later.
32
  
B. The Birth of the Modern-Day Foreign Claims Act: World War II 
Near the beginning of World War II, the United States recognized 
the necessity of updating the 1918 Indemnity Act.
33
 In July 1941, the 
Secretary of the Navy urged Congress to enact a new claims act to 
provide coverage for the U.S. presence in Iceland.
34
 Earlier that 
month, Iceland‘s prime minister sent a message to President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt explaining that Iceland was prepared to let the United 
States send troops to its country in order to bolster Iceland‘s 
defense.
35
 The Prime Minister made the agreement contingent on the 
 
It is what the other armies are doing. If that is what the British troops are doing, as I 
understand they are; if that is what the French troops are compelled by their own 
Government to do, and it follows the custom of our own military forces, then being 
over in that country and fighting by their side, we ought to be willing to do that 
ourselves. I do not think the bill needs any change as it stands.  
Id.  
 30. Id. Green continued:  
[A]nd even if we should pay some claim that was somewhat exaggerated, or one for 
which no liability would arise in our own country, it would be well worth all it cost in 
sustaining the friendly feeling that now exists between us and those who are our allies 
in fact if not in name. 
Id.  
 31. Id. at 4805. 
 32. See Indemnity Act, ch. 57, Pub. L. No. 65-133, 40 Stat. 532 (1918), repealed by Act 
of Apr. 22, 1943, 57 Stat. 66, § 5 (1943).  
 33. U.S. DEP‘T OF THE ARMY, PAMPHLET NO. 27-162, CLAIMS PROCEDURES 134–5 
(2008) [hereinafter DA PAM. 27-162], available at http://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/pdf/p27 
_162.pdf. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Message from the Prime Minister of Iceland to the President of the United States, July 
1, 1941, 55 Stat. 1547, 1547.  
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United States‘ acceptance of eight conditions, the most relevant of 
which required the United States to ―undertake defense of the country 
without expense to Iceland and promise compensation for all damage 
occasioned to inhabitants by their military activities.‖36 President 
Roosevelt
37
 agreed to all eight conditions.
38
  
In December 1941, with a new incentive to improve the foreign 
claims process, the Senate‘s Committee on Naval Affairs considered 
and reported favorably on a bill to settle claims for damages caused 
by American armed forces in foreign countries.
39
 The bill was 
intended to authorize the Secretaries of War and Navy during a then-
present national emergency to appoint a claims commission to settle 
the claims.
40
 After clearing the House of Representative‘s Committee 
on Claims,
41
 the House subsequently approved the bill, noting its 
similarity to the 1918 Indemnity Act.
42
 The bill was signed on 
January 2, 1942
43
 and was to be effective for the duration of the 
 
 36. Id. at 1547–48. Iceland‘s prime minister was concerned about not only potential 
invasion but also the possibility that the United States would try to stake a claim in its 
sovereignty after the war was over. Id. Additionally, British forces originally stationed in 
Iceland for its protection were preparing to leave as they were needed elsewhere. Id. 
Consequently, Iceland wanted to ensure that the United States would agree to the conditions 
before accepting U.S. protection. Id.  
 37. Id. The President promised ―compensation for all damage occasioned to the 
inhabitants by [the United States‘] military activities.‖ Id. at 1549.  
 38. Id. In an explanation regarding why the United States would send its troops to Iceland, 
the president explained that it is the policy of the United States to ward off attempts at 
aggression and to protect the New World. Id.  
 39. See S. REP. NO. 77-872 (1941).  
 40. Id. President Roosevelt had declared a national emergency effective May 27, 1941. 
Proclamation No. 2487, 55 Stat. 1647 (May 27, 1941). 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 77-1503 (1941).  
 42. 87 CONG. REC. 10074 (1941). Congressman Michener inquired, ―This bill is similar to 
an act that was in existence during [World War I]?‖ Id. Congressman Ramspeck replied, ―Yes.‖ 
Id.  
 43. Act of Jan. 2, 1942, ch. 645, Pub. L. No. 77-133, 55 Stat. 880 (1942). The new statute 
read in relevant part,  
To provide for the prompt settlement of claims for damages occasioned by Army, 
Navy, and Marine Corps forces in foreign countries . . . [t]hat during the national 
emergency declared by the President on May 27, 1941, to exist, and for the purpose of 
promoting and maintaining friendly relations by the prompt settlement of meritorious 
claims, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are hereby authorized to 
appoint a Claims Commission or Commissions . . . to consider, adjust, determine and 
make payments in final settlement of bona fide claims on account of damages caused 
by Army, Navy, and Marine Corps forces, or individual members thereof, in a foreign 
country or possession thereof . . . to the property, public or private, or the person of 
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national emergency as declared by President Roosevelt.
44
  
This new statute underwent further changes, however, and in a 
letter dated March 3, 1943, the Chief of the Foreign Claims Branch, 
Major Roy L. Deal, urged Congress to amend the most recent version 
of the statute adopted in 1942.
45
 Deal advocated for an increase in the 
amount allowed to be paid from the previous limit of $1,000 to a new 
limit of $5,000, reasoning that it would ―tend to promote friendly 
relations with foreign countries in which we may have military or 
naval forces.‖46 The Committee approved the amendments, and the 
statute that eventually became the modern-day FCA was signed on 
April 22, 1943.
47
  
The FCA was used effectively throughout World War II, 
particularly toward the end of the war when the United States 
temporarily shifted its claims adjudication duties to the respective 
countries in which the claims occurred.
48
 For example, in normal 
circumstances, if a U.S. soldier damaged a French civilian‘s property, 
 
inhabitants of such foreign countries, where the amount of such claim does not exceed 
$1,000.  
Id. 
 44. See Proclamation No. 2487, supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 45. H.R. REP. NO. 78-312 (1943).  
 46. Id. Additionally, the House of Representatives‘ Committee on Claims recommended 
that language preventing combat-related damages be included. Id. Major Deal noted, however, 
that while language preventing those types of damages was not in the previous act, his claims 
office had considered that clause to be implicit because ―under the laws of war, such claims are 
not allowed by any country.‖ Id. 
 47. Act of Apr. 22, 1943, ch. 67, Pub. L. No. 78-39, 57 Stat. 66 (1943). The main explicit 
change from the FCA as adopted in 1942 is that claims were then payable ―when such damage, 
loss, destruction, or injury is caused by Army, Navy, or Marine Corps forces, or individual 
members thereof, or otherwise incident to noncombat activities of such forces, where the 
amount of such claim does not exceed $5,000.‖ Id. Additionally, the new statute added,  
That no claim of any national of any country at war with the United States, or of any 
ally of such enemy country, except as the Commission or the local military 
commander shall determine that the claimant is friendly to the United States, and no 
claim resulting from action by the enemy or resulting directly or indirectly from any 
act by our armed forces engaged in combat, shall be allowed under this Act.  
Id. This last excerpt is the combat exclusion provision discussed infra notes 84–86. 
 48. REPORT OF THE GEN. BD., supra note 7, at 23–24. This procedure was an improvised 
policy that the United States negotiated with several European nations to complete claims filed 
toward the end of World War II. Id. The original idea for this policy came from dealings with 
the British. Id. at 24. However, the United States was so pleased with the results from the 
experience with Britain that it decided to negotiate a similar policy with France, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Norway, and Luxembourg. Id.  
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U.S. personnel would adjudicate the claim.
49
 However, under this 
temporary system, the French government would adjudicate the 
French civilian‘s claim against the U.S. military and then send the 
bill to the United States.
50
 One military report noted that this system 
was more effective because the countries could dispose of the claims 
with their own ―local customs, diverse laws, standards of justice and 
measurement of damages‖ of which U.S. claims personnel were not 
familiar.
51
 Moreover, the process was even more successful in 
countries that had significant language, law, and custom barriers.
52
 
Consequently, the report explains that this type of claims process 
worked more effectively because the claims‘ personnel were 
knowledgeable about the local law and custom of the host nation.
53
  
C. Application of the Law Today 
Following World War II, the temporary claims system ceased,
54
 
and after minor amendments made over the next thirteen years, the 
 
 49. See Applicable law for claims under the Foreign Claims Act, 32 C.F.R. § 536.139 
(2006). 
 50. REPORT OF THE GEN. BD., supra note 7, at 24. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. For example, the French and the Dutch had better success with this improvised 
claims policy than did the British. Id. 
 53. Id. The report also noted the problems that arose when claimants felt that their rights 
were being violated. Id. at 25–26. For example, one claimant was paid $50 for a piece of 
damaged property that actually cost $300 to repair or replace. Id. at 25. However, the report 
explained that, on the whole, it could ―hardly be doubted that in the vast majority of cases, 
goodwill has been created to the extent of more than justifying the expenditures made under the 
act.‖ Id. at 26. Additionally, ―The relief afforded not only pleased the individual directly 
involved but made him an agent of goodwill for the United States among his neighbors.‖ Id. 
Overall, the report made clear that claimants generally had more satisfaction with this new 
process, which adhered more effectively to the local laws and customs of the respective nations. 
See id. 
 54. DA PAM. 27-162, supra note 33, at 135. While this policy was temporary then, there 
are currently similar policies in place in many of the countries in which U.S. soldiers are 
permanently stationed. Id. For example, Article VIII of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Status of Forces Agreement provides that when U.S. forces damage property of a third-party 
claimant in the receiving country in the scope of their duty, the claim will be filed with the 
authorities from that receiving country. Id. DA PAM. 27-162 is illustrative: ―Thus, a claim 
arising from U.S. Army activities in Germany would properly be presented to German 
authorities and not to the U.S. Army. The German authorities would then adjudicate the claim 
under German law.‖ Id. 
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FCA was made permanent in 1956.
55
 The FCA has changed little 
since its 1956 enactment.
56
 Consequently, most of the FCA‘s 
substance comes from military regulations.
57
 These regulations help 
provide the framework for how the FCA operates today.
58
 
The claims process begins by determining whether the FCA is the 
appropriate system to adjudicate the claim, as some exceptions 
preempt the FCA.
59
 Assuming the claim is not preempted, the first 
step is to determine whether there is a proper claimant.
60
 A claimant 
must be an inhabitant of a foreign country
61
 who alleges damage to 
his/her property or injury to his/her person.
62
 If the claimant is proper, 
then the claim will be referred to a claims commission based on the 
commission‘s geographic and financial area of responsibility.63 Either 
a one-person Foreign Claims Commission (FCC) or a three-person 
FCC will oversee the claim, depending on the monetary value.
64
 
 
 55. Id. at 135.  
 56. Id. There have been some minor changes in the FCA since 1956, mostly involving 
raising the amount of money that can be paid out in a claim. See 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2006). 
 57. See AR 27-20, supra note 3; DA PAM. 27-162, supra note 33; OPERATIONAL LAW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 14. One example of how the regulations give substance to the FCA is 
the FCA‘s usage of the word ―inhabitant.‖ DA PAM. 27-162, supra note 33, at 135. While not 
defined in the FCA, DA PAM. 27-162 provides a definition: ―[T]he word ‗inhabitant‘ conveys a 
broader meaning than do either the words ‗citizen‘ or ‗national.‘‖ Id. The pamphlet also 
explains that whether a person is an inhabitant is usually obvious; however, it lists examples 
and exceptions for more gray areas that a claims commissioner would not know simply by 
looking at the language of the FCA. Id. For further discussion of how the military has used 
regulations to define the FCA, see REPORT OF THE GEN. BD., supra note 7, at 15. 
 58. See AR 27-20, supra note 3; DA PAM. 27-162, supra note 33; OPERATIONAL LAW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 14. 
 59. One of the primary doctrines that sometimes preempts a claim from being adjudicated 
under the FCA is a Status of Forces Agreement (―SOFA‖). OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 
supra note 14, at 316. For a basic background of SOFAs, see R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL 34531, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT (SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND HOW 
HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? (2011), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34531.pdf (―Status of 
Forces Agreements . . . generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel 
operate in a foreign country, addressing how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction shall 
be applied toward U.S. personnel while in that country.‖). 
 60. See 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2006). 
 61. Id. § 2734(a). Soldiers and civilian employees of the United States would not qualify 
under this definition. DA PAM. 27-162, supra note 33, at 135.  
 62. See 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a). However, that injury or damage cannot come from situations 
that are combat related. Id. § 2734(b)(3). 
 63. DA PAM. 27-162, supra note 33, at 137. 
 64. AR 27-20, supra note 3, at 54. A one-member FCC has a $15,000 monetary authority 
if he is a judge advocate or a claims attorney; otherwise, the FCC has a $5,000 monetary 
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Acceptance of payment by the claimant constitutes full satisfaction of 
the claim.
65
  
D. The Local Law and Custom Provision and its Exceptions 
One important provision applied in all foreign claims
66
 is that 
claims commissioners must abide by the law and custom of the 
country in which the claim originates in order to properly adjudicate 
the claim.
67
 The Operational Law Handbook, used by claims 
commissioners, explains how to adhere to this provision.
68
 Regarding 
predeployment protocol, the handbook encourages commissioners to 
familiarize themselves with the FCA and the local law and custom of 
the region to which they will be deployed.
69
 It also instructs the 
commissioners to apply the law of the host nation in determining 
both liability and damages.
70
 If further guidance is necessary, the 
Handbook advises claims commissioners to contact the Chief of 
 
authority. Id. A three-member field FCC may approve any claim not exceeding $50,000. Id. If 
the claim exceeds $50,000, then the claim will be forwarded to the Commander of the U.S. 
Army Claims Service. Id. Any payment in excess of $100,000 must be approved by the 
Secretary of the Army or its appropriate designee. Id.  
 65. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(e). 
 66. One exclusion, however, is if the claim was combat related. Id. § 2734(b)(3). When 
this occurs, the claim never reaches the point of applying the local law custom because it is 
excluded from payment. Id.  
 67. AR 27-20, supra note 3, at 52. The FCA mandates that ―[i]n determining an 
appropriate award, the law and custom of the country in which the incident occurred will be 
applied to determine which elements of damages are payable and which individuals are entitled 
to compensation.‖ Id.  
 However, there is one exception for claims in which the claimant is from another country 
and was temporarily located in the country in which the claim occurred:  
[W]here the claimant is an inhabitant of another foreign country and only temporarily 
within the country in which the incident occurred, the quantum of certain elements of 
damages, such as lost wages and future medical care, may be calculated based on the 
law and economic conditions in the country of the claimant‘s permanent residence. 
Where the decedent is the subject of a wrongful death case, the quantum will be 
determined based on the country of the decedent‘s permanent residence regardless of 
the fact that his survivors live in the United States or a different foreign country than 
the decedent.  
Id.  
 68. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 316.  
 69. Id. The handbook also instructs claims commissioners to ―attempt to compile local 
law summaries for all countries in which the unit is likely to conduct operations.‖ Id.  
 70. Id. The handbook adds that this inquiry ―includes the local law or custom pertaining to 
contributory or comparative negligence and joint tortfeasors.‖ Id.  
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Claims in the appropriate host nation;
71
 the Command Claims Service 
with geographic responsibility for the country, if present;
72
 and the 
U.S. Army Claims Service.
73
 Finally, the handbook notes that, after a 
claims commissioner has deployed, he may contact either ―local 
attorneys for assistance, or obtain information on local law and 
custom from the U.S. Consulate or Embassy located in-country.‖74  
In addition to the handbook‘s guidance, the military teaches 
several classes designed to instruct claims commissioners on the 
broader subject of foreign claims, of which local law and custom is a 
subtopic.
75
 For example, each commissioner must complete a four-
hour claims class and pass an examination before becoming certified 
to adjudicate claims.
76
 Additionally, deploying claims commissioners 
attend a one-day Deployment Claims Conference at Fort Meade, 
Maryland.
77
  
In addition to this training, the Army also encourages claims 
commissioners to attend a predeployment preparation program titled 
the Brigade Judge Advocate Mission Primer (BJAMP).
78
 The 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Telephone Interview with Foreign Torts Branch, U.S. Army Claims Serv., Fort 
Meade, Md. (Jan. 6, 2012). 
 73. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 316. 
 74. Id. The handbook also gives advice regarding conflict of law situations in which the 
local law and custom would be inapplicable either because of policy reasons or because there is 
nothing in the local law that pertains to the situation presented in the claim. Id. The handbook 
advises claims commissioners to follow the general principles applicable to tort law that are 
discussed in AR 27-20. Id. 
 75. Telephone Interview with Foreign Torts Branch, supra note 72.  
 76. Id.; see also Rochelle M. Howard, Foreign Claims Training, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL‘S CORPS, https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/8525752700445D3A/0/E22A6AF5445863 
DF8525765F004D794A/$file/FCC%20Training%20Oct%2009.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) 
(curriculum for class); FCC Appointment Qualification Exam v.1228, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE 
GENERAL‘S CORPS, https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/8525752700445D3A/0/30D6DD8EAED7C 
6918525787D00676801/$file/FCC%20Quiz.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) (quiz for class). 
 77. Memorandum from LTC Gregory S. Mathers, Chief, Tort Claims Division, U.S. 
Army (May 4, 2010) (on file with author). 
 78. OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., Pre-Deployment Preparation Program 
Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/__85257578006B54AF.nsf/0/ 
168B0C1795FD0E828525776600681530?Open&Highlight=2,bjamp (click ―Frequently Asked 
Questions‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 7, 2012) [hereinafter PDP FAQ]. 
 This program is a part of LTG Scott C. Black‘s—the Army‘s former Judge Advocate 
General—official Pre-Deployment Preparation Program (PDP). See Memorandum from LTG 
Scott C. Black, Judge Advocate General, U.S. Army, to Judge Advocate Legal Services 
Personnel, U.S. Army (Feb. 3, 2009), https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/85257578006B5F7E/0/ 
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BJAMP is a three-day course that teaches claims commissioners 
about legal issues they might face in upcoming deployments.
79
 The 
course covers all legal issues as opposed to strictly claims-related 
topics. Because of the breadth of legal issues required to be taught in 
the program, the curriculum is only able to allot minimal time to 
instruct claims commissioners on the specific local law and custom of 
the nation or region to which they are deploying.
80
 
Today, many claims commissioners engage in ad hoc methods, 
discussed infra Part II, as they try to comply with the local law and 
custom provision.
81
 Due to the complexity of the local law and 
custom in countries like Iraq and particularly Afghanistan, many 
commissioners struggle to determine the proper local law and 
custom.
82
  
1. Limitations on the FCA and the Local Law & Custom 
Provision  
While the Foreign Claims Act is written so that claims are 
adjudicated in accordance with local law and custom, certain 
provisions limit its applicability.
83
 The FCA‘s largest limitation is the 
combat exclusion provision, which prevents the payment of claims 
that arise in combat-related situations.
84
 This provision provides that, 
 
C58E252DED753B84852575780057510A/$file/PDP%20Policy%20Memo.pdf. The PDP is a 
program designed to prepare judge advocates for deployment. Id.  
 79. PDP FAQ, supra note 78. 
 80. For example, the program has only a one-hour course on the broad subject of ―Islamic 
Law and Culture.‖ OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN., Brigade Judge Advocate Mission 
Primer Agenda, https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/__85257578006B54AF.nsf/0/168B0C1795FD0 
E828525776600681530?Open&Highlight=2,bjamp (click ―BJAMP Agenda.docx‖ hyperlink) 
(last visited Jan. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Mission Primer]. 
 81. LEGAL LESSONS VOL. I, supra note 15, at 186. 
 82. Id.; see also discussion infra Part II.  
 83. 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2006); see also AR 27-20, supra note 3, at 51; DA PAM. 27-162, 
supra note 33, at 136. 
 84. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(b)(3). The FCA states, ―A claim may be allowed . . . only if it did 
not arise from action by an enemy or result directly or indirectly from an act of the armed forces 
of the United States in combat.‖ Id. It then provides an exception—which indicates that the 
situation could still be a valid claim—for circumstances in which an accident occurs relative to 
an aircraft if the situation was ―indirectly related to combat, and occurring while preparing for, 
going to, or returning from a combat mission.‖ Id.  
 However, the United States‘ military has two separate programs—Solatia and the 
Commander‘s Emergency Response Program (―CERP‖)—that are not limited by the combat 
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regardless of the local law, no claim will be paid if the claims 
commissioner determines that the situation was related to combat.
85
 
Since the FCA‘s enactment, the combat exclusion has occasionally 
puzzled claims commissioners who struggle to determine a consistent 
definition for what exactly is ―combat‖ or ―combat-related.‖86  
 
exclusion provision. Solatia payments are given as an expression of sympathy toward a victim 
or his family when there is no legal mechanism to make a claim. See AR 27-20, supra note 3, at 
55. However, the maximum payout is $2,500. Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, The War 
on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1795 (2009). To illustrate an example 
when a Solatia payment would be effective: if the United States injured an innocent Iraqi 
civilian in a firefight, it most likely could not pay the claim under the Foreign Claims Act 
because of the combat exclusion. Id. at 136. However, the United States could pay out a Solatia 
claim as a gesture of sympathy. AR 27-20, supra note 3, at 55.  
 CERP payments can be used in similar situations. The Judge Advocate General 
Operational Law Handbook notes, ―CERP appropriated funds may be used for condolence 
payments to individual civilians for the death or physical injury resulting from U.S. . . . military 
operations that are not compensable under the Foreign Claims Act.‖ OPERATIONAL LAW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 242. They can also be used to repair property damage that would 
not be payable under the FCA. Id.  
 For further discussion on these programs, see Will Oremus, How Cheap Is an Iraqi Life?: 
The Thorny Debate Over Compensation Payments and Why It Matters to the U.S. War Effort, 
SLATE (Dec. 23, 2010, 10:28 A.M.), http://www.slate.com/id/2278387/; Walter Pincus, The 
Measure of a Life in Dollar and Cents, WASH. POST, JUNE 18, 2007, at A15. 
 85. 10 U.S.C. § 2734(b)(3). The Army Regulation for Claims and its affiliated pamphlet 
shed some light on what defines a ―combat activity.‖ AR 27-20 defines combat activities as 
―[a]ctivities resulting directly or indirectly from action by the enemy, or by the Armed Forces 
of the United States engaged in armed conflict, or in immediate preparation for impending 
armed conflict.‖ AR 27-20, supra note 3, at 107. DA PAM. 27-162 explains that  
[c]laims arising ‗directly or indirectly‘ from combat activities of the U.S. armed forces 
are not payable. Whether damages sustained in areas of armed conflict are attributable 
to combat activities or noncombat activities depends upon the facts of each case. 
Damages caused by enemy action, or by the U.S. armed services resisting or attacking 
an enemy or preparing for immediate combat with an enemy, are certain to be 
considered as arising from combat activities.  
DA PAM. 27-162, supra note 33, at 136.  
 86. A good example of this confusion occurred in the beginning of the Iraq war. The U.S. 
Air Force had a procedure in which it classified all claims as ―combat activity‖ for no other 
reason than that the claim took place in Iraq. Sitaraman, supra note 84, at 1793–94. So, for 
example, if a U.S. truck negligently crashed into an Iraqi‘s vehicle on a routine supply route 
during this time period, the claim would not have been payable. See id.  
 However, the definition for the combat-exclusion provision has recently been changed to 
provide claims commissioners with better guidance. Telephone Interview with Foreign Torts 
Branch, supra note 72.  
 For further discussion on the combat exclusion provision, see Michael D. Jones, 
Consistency and Equality: A Framework for Analyzing the “Combat Activities Exclusion” of 
the Foreign Claims Act, 204 MIL. L. REV. 144 (2010); John Fabian Witt, Form and Substance 
in the Law of Counterinsurgency Damages, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1455 (2008); Jordan 
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Several other minor limitations preclude claims from being 
adjudicated in accordance with the local law and custom. For 
example, FCA regulation forbids insurers or third-party payers from 
asserting a claim against the United States.
87
 Additionally, claims that 
are not in the ―best interest of the United States, [are] contrary to 
public policy, or otherwise‖ contrary to the intent of the statute may 
not be paid out.
88
 Finally, there are numerous limitations on damages, 
regardless of the local custom, including a prohibition against paying 
a claimant‘s court costs, the costs of preparing a claim, expert witness 
fees, and punitive damages.
89
 Consequently, while the FCA mandates 
that the local law and custom be applied in adjudicating foreign 
claims, these limitations may prevent this from happening. 
E. The FCA’s Relationship to the U.S. War Strategy—the 
Counterinsurgency Doctrine  
While the FCA originated in World War I, it is still being 
implemented as part of the war strategy that the United States uses 
today in the form of the Counterinsurgency Doctrine.
90
 The field 
manual for counterinsurgency describes the doctrine as a ―mix of 
offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along 
multiple lines of operations. It requires Soldiers and Marines to 
employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often 
associated with nonmilitary agencies.‖91 Furthermore, forces that 
have practiced counterinsurgency effectively have generally 
―[l]earned about the broader world outside the military and requested 
outside assistance in understanding foreign political, cultural, social 
and other situations beyond their experience.‖92 As opposed to 
 
Walerstein, Note, Coping with Combat Claims: An analysis of the Foreign Claims Act’s 
Combat Exclusion, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 319 (2009).  
 87. 32 C.F.R. § 536.138(l) (2011). 
 88. Id. § 536.138(h). The statute continues by providing an example of this limitation in 
which the United States should not pay out a claim if the claimant was from a country 
considered to be unfriendly to the United States. Id.  
 89. AR 27-20, supra note 3, at 24. 
 90. FM 3-24, supra note 12, at D-8. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual discusses the 
FCA in the ―Legal Considerations‖ section of the manual. Id. 
 91. Id. at Foreword. 
 92. Id. at x. 
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conventional warfare, counterinsurgency warfare places a greater 
emphasis on understanding and adhering to local culture.
93
 As a 
result, the U.S. military has had to adjust its training. Indeed, many 
U.S. military units today undergo training scenarios that familiarize 
soldiers with the culture that they will encounter overseas.
94
  
II. ANALYZING THE MILITARY‘S APPLICATION OF THE LOCAL LAW  
& CUSTOM PROVISION 
There is little doubt that an integral part of serving the FCA‘s 
purpose requires that the local law and custom is applied to the 
adjudication of the claims. Beginning with General Pershing in 
World War I and extending to the modern-day definition of a foreign 
claim, the FCA has always emphasized the importance of ensuring 
that the local law and custom of the host nation is applied to all 
qualifying claims.
95
 Indeed, the results from the claims filed in World 
War II illustrate that the FCA works more effectively when claims 
commissioners are thoroughly knowledgeable about the local law and 
custom.
96
 Furthermore, because of the emphasis that the 
counterinsurgency war strategy places on understanding and 
respecting the local population‘s culture, it is equally if not more 
important for claims commissioners to understand and correctly 
apply the proper local law and custom to foreign claims.
97
  
 
 93. Id. at 1-23. The manual notes,  
In most COIN operations in which U.S. forces participate, insurgents hold a distinct 
advantage in their level of local knowledge. They speak the language, move easily 
within the society, and are more likely to understand the population‘s interests. Thus, 
effective COIN operations require a greater emphasis on certain skills, such as 
language and cultural understanding, than does conventional warfare. The 
interconnected, politico-military nature of insurgency and COIN requires immersion in 
the people and their lives to achieve victory. 
Id. 
 94. See Kevin Stabinsky, Linguists Key to Success for Afghan Soldiers Training in U.S., 
U.S. DEP‘T OF DEFENSE (Nov. 2, 2006), http://www.defense.gov/news/NewsArticle.aspx?ID 
=1998; see also discussion infra Part III. 
 95. See discussion supra Part I. 
 96. REPORT OF THE GEN. BD., supra note 7, at 23–24; see also discussion supra Part I.B. 
 97. While the FCA is clearly an important aspect of the counterinsurgency doctrine, the 
two policies have similar explicit purposes as well—they both have a strong focus on catering 
to the local population. Whereas the FCA‘s stated purpose is to ―promote and maintain friendly 
relations‖ with the host nation and its people, 10 U.S.C. § 2734(a) (2006), the counter 
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The problem, however, is that too often the commissioners 
charged with adjudicating the foreign claims improperly identify the 
local law and custom of the host nation and thus do not (and cannot) 
apply it properly.
98
 This is in large part due to the lack of a uniform 
policy that provides specific guidance on how to identify the local 
law and custom.
99
 Because of this, the claims commissioners‘ 
protocol in identifying and applying the local law and custom often 
involves engaging in ad hoc techniques.
100
 Furthermore, claims 
commissioners have at times minimal confidence that they are 
applying the correct local law and custom to the claim.
101
  
One technique that some commissioners use to determine the local 
law and custom is to ask local, host-nation attorneys who presumably 
have a better understanding of the law.
102
 This approach has 
 
insurgency doctrine notes that ―by focusing on efforts to secure the safety and support of the 
local populace, and through a concerted effort to truly function as learning organizations, the 
Army and Marine Corps can defeat their insurgent enemies.‖ FM 3-24, supra note 12, at x 
(emphasis added). 
 98. See LEGAL LESSONS VOL. I, supra note 15, at 186–87. 
 99. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 316. 
 100. See LEGAL LESSONS VOL. I, supra note 15, at 186–87; 2 CTR. FOR LAW AND 
MILITARY OPERATIONS, LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ, FULL 
SPECTRUM OPERATIONS 186–87 (2004) [hereinafter LEGAL LESSONS VOL. II], available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/clamo-v2.pdf; see also OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, 
supra note 14, at 316. 
 101. See LEGAL LESSONS VOL II, supra note 100, at 187. Claims in Iraq could be 
considered an exception to this point, as many claims commissioners in that country have 
concluded that Iraqi tort and liability law is similar to the type of law practiced in the United 
States. Id. at 187–88. LTC Karin Tackaberry, a judge advocate who was formerly with the 82nd 
Airborne Division, provides a good example of this. Karin Tackaberry, Judge Advocates Play a 
Major Role in Rebuilding Iraq: The Foreign Claims Act and Implementation of the 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program, 2004-FEB ARMY LAW. 39, 40. She deployed 
with her unit to the Al Anbar province of Iraq in September of 2003. Id. LTC Tackaberry noted 
that, although foreign claims required the applicability of the law and custom of the country in 
which the incident occurred, ―Fortunately, Iraqi tort law follows the same basic principles as 
common law torts.‖ Id. As a result, claims commissioners could use their previous legal 
experience and training from United States common law to ascertain the proper law to apply in 
the assessment of liability and damages. Id.  
 However, at least one scholar has disagreed with the notion that the two laws are similar. 
See Witt, supra note 86, at 1476. John Fabian Witt, a professor of legal history at Columbia 
Law School, noted that while the ―official army line on the local tort law of Iraq is that it 
resembles the Anglo-American common law of torts . . . that is almost certainly untrue, and 
there is very little to make us think that anyone put much time into deciding one way or 
another.‖ Id. 
 102. LEGAL LESSONS VOL. II, supra note 100, at 187; see also OPERATIONAL LAW 
HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 316. 
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encountered problems in the past, however, as the advice from local 
attorneys was often inconsistent and contradictory.
103
 Other 
commissioners rely on interpreters.
104
 However, this could be 
problematic as interpreters are not experts in the law, and in the past, 
the interpreters were more likely to only be able to assess the custom 
for damages rather than for liability.
105
  
Compliance under the provision is made more difficult because 
there is not necessarily a consistent methodology in determining and 
then applying the local law and custom of the host nation. And while 
the military has programs in place to provide some training regarding 
the proper protocols by which to identify and then apply the local law 
and custom provision,
106
 more efficient and effective programs could 
be instituted to better ensure that the proper laws are applied in the 
proper regions.
107
 Further, those same programs could compile the 
amount of knowledge that would be passed from one deployment to 
the next.
108
 
The problem of either not knowing or improperly applying the 
local law and custom to a claim is only amplified for claims filed in 
countries that either have no published legal code or have 
considerably different laws and customs than the United States.
109
 
Afghanistan, for example, has multiple types of both formal and 
informal laws.
110
 One report from a nonprofit organization that 
 
 103. LEGAL LESSONS VOL. II, supra note 100, at 187. Claims commissioners determined 
that there were a variety of factors that led to these inconsistencies from the local attorneys, 
including different laws from discrete areas as well as local attorneys being biased to their 
nearby regions. Id.  
 104. LEGAL LESSONS VOL. I, supra note 15, at 187.  
 105. See id. Interpreters were considered to be especially useful in determining the amount 
of damages that a claim was worth. Id. For example, if a U.S. vehicle struck a claimant‘s 
donkey, the interpreter could tell the claims commissioner whether $330 was a reasonable value 
for the donkey. Id.  
 106. See supra notes 68–80 and accompanying text. 
 107. See infra Part III. 
 108. See infra Part III. 
 109. For example, claims commissioners encountered an unusual local law and custom in 
Somalia in 1993. Vanessa Blum, After the War, Time to Pay: How Jag Lawyers settle Foreign 
Claims over Noncombat Damage, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 21, 2003, at 1. The lawyers were trying 
to assess wrongful death claims in the country, and according to Somalia‘s law, a man‘s life 
was valued at 100 camels and a woman‘s life at 50 camels. Id. The defense department, seeing 
a very expensive issue, decided to establish a ceiling of $10,000 for death claims. Id.  
 110. AFG. LEGAL EDUC. PROJECT, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF AFGHANISTAN 3 (3d 
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discusses Afghani customary laws divides the country into four 
geographic regions, based primarily on the discrete customs of each 
region.
111
 Another authority on Afghani law explains that, while 
Afghanistan has both a constitution and a civil code, many Afghani 
tribes rely on a custom-based legal system rather than on formal 
Afghani civil law to resolve disputes.
112
 When one claims 
commissioner was charged with assessing damages for a 19-year-old 
Afghan struck by a military vehicle, he was unsure which law should 
be applied.
113
 Needing an answer, the claims commissioner spoke to 
expatriate Afghani lawyers and decided to apply remedy principles 
similar to U.S. law.
114
 Although this situation did not result in any 
known problems, this type of approach could lead to disgruntled 
Afghanis if, for example, the expatriate Afghani lawyers gave 
incorrect advice. Indeed, other situations have caused problems when 
attorneys did not properly understand the local law and custom.
115
  
 
ed. 2011), available at http://alep.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Intro-Book-3d-
Edition.pdf. 
 111. INT‘L LEGAL FOUND., supra note 2. 
 112. See AFG. LEGAL EDUC. PROJECT, supra note 110, at 3. This type of custom-based law 
could be considered a form of alternative dispute resolution. Id. As opposed to settling disputes 
through the formal written law as applied in court, many Afghanis settle their disputes through 
this alternative method. Id. at 4. Many of those Afghani citizens turn to this method of resolving 
disputes because it is ―considered more fair, efficient, accessible, and respectful of the local 
values than the [formal] system.‖ Id. Rather than wait for the slow legal process, an Afghani 
would approach his tribal elders to assist in mediating the dispute. Id. at 3. The institutions 
comprised of these elders are often called shuras or jirgas. Id. This version of dispute resolution 
applies an informal law, custom, or tradition and has existed in Afghanistan for centuries. Id. 
Furthermore, these practices are still considered to be strongly prevalent but are especially 
popular in more rural regions of the country. Id. at 4.  
 113. Blum, supra note 109, at 2. 
 114. Id. To assess damages, the lawyer considered the man‘s age, future earnings, and 
dependents. Id.  
 115. For example, in a nonclaims-related situation, the attorney Natalie Rea, who now 
works as a staff attorney for the Legal Aid Society of New York, worked for an organization in 
Rwanda as a defense attorney for prisoners in that country. Leonard Post, Teaching Defense: 
US Lawyers Teach Afghan Attorneys the Art of Defense, NAT. LAW J., Jan. 10, 2005, available 
at http://theilf.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/National-Law-Journal-Teaching-Defense.pdf. 
Rea‘s initial strategy was to obtain plea bargains for the over 125,000 prisoners she and three 
other attorneys were in charge of defending. Id. However, she did not know that ―a Rwandan 
would never admit to something just to get a shorter sentence‖ because it would cause the 
community to shun them. Id. Rea‘s organization learned from the mistake and, in an indication 
of the importance of understanding the customary laws of a nation, later undertook a mission to 
create a compilation of customary laws of Afghanistan, where the organization was defending 
Afghanis. Id. The compilation of customary laws is cited INT‘L LEGAL FOUND., supra note 2. 
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The problem is not that claims commissioners refuse to cooperate 
with the provision. Indeed, as evidenced by many examples, 
commissioners are seeking out their own unique methods in an effort 
to comply with the provision.
116
 Instead, the difficulty is that there is 
little to no uniform system in place to ensure that the proper local law 
and custom is consistently and correctly identified.
117
 Without an 
effective system, claims commissioners have a difficult time 
ascertaining exactly what the local law and custom actually is, and as 
a result, each claims office utilizes inconsistent procedures in an 
attempt to understand and apply the local law and custom—a process 
that too often falls short of upholding the original intent of the 
FCA.
118
  
III. PROPOSAL  
The solution to this problem lies in creating a consistent process 
used throughout the military to assist claims commissioners in 
determining what the local law and custom is in the region in which 
they adjudicate claims. I propose two distinct methodologies, each 
addressing the unique challenges of a country‘s universal legal 
system or lack thereof, that can provide a consistent process for all 
claims commissioners.  
A. Countries Without a Universal Legal System 
For claims filed in countries without a universal legal system,
119
 I 
propose a system that revolves around a central claims database. The 
database can provide claims commissioners with information about 
the local law and custom of the host region. To start the database, 
though, the first unit that deploys to a new region would need to 
initiate something that could constitute a foundation of the region‘s 
laws. This foundation would be the starting point for the database, 
 
See also supra note 2 and accompanying text for an example of a possible consequence of not 
applying the proper local law and custom to a claim. 
 116. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. 
 117. See OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 316. 
 118. Id.; see also supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text. 
 119. See, e.g., supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text.  
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and with every subsequent deployment, more information about that 
specific region could be added by each new claims commissioner.  
The logistics of creating a foundation of law are not that far 
removed from what the military already does for deploying units—it 
teaches the units certain customs of the region to which the unit will 
be deploying.
120
 Indeed, many units have a predeployment strategy in 
which they train in mock environments intended to familiarize the 
soldiers with the region and culture they will encounter.
121
 The 3rd 
Brigade Combat Team (―BCT‖) from the 1st Armored Division did 
just this in a training scenario in New Mexico.
122
 In preparing for a 
deployment to Afghanistan, the BCT hired a private government 
contractor to lead a training scenario designed to teach its soldiers 
Afghani social skills.
123
 The brigade commander emphasized the 
importance of the training scenario in helping his soldiers understand 
the local culture, particularly because winning over the hearts and 
minds of the local population was central to their mission.
124
  
Just as the military uses experts to compile and teach the customs 
of specific cultures, so too could the military organize a group of 
experts to create a foundation of the laws of a particular region. 
These experts would essentially amount to a think tank that would 
 
 120. Stabinsky, supra note 94; see also Robert Gray, Wooing Afghan Hearts and Minds, 
ABQJOURNAL.COM (Oct. 3, 2010), http://www.abqjournal.com/news/state/03232448state10-
03-10.htm. 
 121. Stabinsky, supra note 94. In this situation, interpreters taught American soldiers about 
Afghan culture, habits, and simple phrases in their language. Id. Hassan Wilson, a native 
Afghan as well as one of the interpreters assisting in this effort, noted that ―[w]hat we do is very 
important.‖ Id. (quoting Hassan Wilson). While interpreters are not related to the combat part of 
the mission, they are ―integral to mission success in a war in which winning the support of the 
Afghan people is equally as important as defeating extremists in combat.‖ Id. 
 122. Robert Gray, supra note 120. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. The brigade commander explained that while governments used to disregard any 
type of diplomacy once the war began, the new counterinsurgency-type warfare is contrary to 
that:  
In a traditional war, diplomacy ends when war begins. . . . The discussion [of 
diplomacy] is over. Wiping out the opposing military force is expected to bring about 
the policy goal. But with counterinsurgency, the discussion is not beside the point; it is 
the point. The whole thing is an argument to win the support of the people.  
Id. The brigade commander also noted that interest in this type of counterinsurgency doctrine is 
rather new and increased greatly following the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 
2003. Id.  
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formulate general themes of the regional law likely to be 
encountered. The think tank could be comprised of attorneys, 
professors, and cultural anthropologists who have studied the specific 
region.
125
 Just as the Army puts together a group of people to teach 
deploying troops about local cultures,
126
 it could also organize a 
similar group of scholars to develop a foundation of laws that the 
claims commissioners could take with them prior to the first 
deployment to the new country.
127
  
Once the foundation of law is created, the compilation of new 
information into the database could begin. Armed with the basic laws 
that the think tank compiled, the claims commissioner could visit the 
tribal elder
128
 of the region and confirm the accuracy of the 
information.
129
 At this point, the claims commissioner would have a 
greater understanding of the region‘s laws and custom and could send 
the information back to the Foreign Torts Branch at Fort Meade, 
Maryland. From there, the Foreign Torts Branch could create a 
database that could be accessible to all future and current claims 
commissioners.
130
  
In addition to gathering information from the tribal elder, claims 
commissioners could record pertinent information on particular 
claims that they paid to claimants. If this information included facts 
about the claim along with explanations as to why the claimant was 
 
 125. It is particularly important that the specific region is researched, as the law could vary 
from one region to the next. See supra notes 103–05, 111.  
 126. See supra notes 121–24 and accompanying text. 
 127. Or, alternatively, it could expand the group it already uses to teach Islamic culture to 
include a group of scholars who could create the foundation of laws. 
 128. For a description of the importance of tribal elders to much of Afghan society, see 
KHALIL NOURI ET AL., RESTORING AFGHANISTAN‘S TRIBAL BALANCE: AN INDIGENOUS PEACE 
PROCESS FOR UNIFYING A SHATTERED NATION (2011), available at http://newworldstrategies 
coalition.org/uploads/NWSC_White_Paper_2.27.11_-_Restoring_Tribal_Balance_1__1_.pdf. The 
report explains, inter alia, how a certain Afghani culture has its law instituted by ruling of a 
Loya Jirga, or a grand assembly of elders. Id. at 8.  
 129. The tribal elder example clearly might not fit for certain nations or cultures. However, 
the military could easily adjust its strategy and consult whoever it thought to be the most 
knowledgeable about local law or the most likely to be in charge of upholding the local law.  
 130. Sending the information to Fort Meade would be an ideal start to this system. Once 
the claims service at Fort Meade is able to put together a prototype, the military could then 
create a database that people across the globe could not only access in order to learn the law but 
could also directly input the information that they have learned. This would be more efficient, 
as it would eliminate Fort Meade as a middleman. 
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paid a particular amount, then future claims commissioners could use 
these examples as a type of ―case law‖ to ensure that claims were 
being adjudicated consistently throughout the region.
131
 
The ultimate goal of this new program is to create a 
comprehensive database that grows with each subsequent 
deployment. It is unreasonable to believe that any one unit or group 
of scholars could put together a perfect compilation of laws for a 
specific region. However, an evolving database is efficient and would 
further the claims mission if, each time a unit deploys, all the 
knowledge learned from the previous deployment is accessible and 
informative. There is little debate that conversations that take place 
between the old and the new claims commissioners when the new 
unit arrives are helpful in conveying information about the local law 
and custom; however, it is virtually impossible for claims 
commissioners to remember everything taught during those 
conversations. Constructing a universal database presents a solution 
that allows everything to be passed on and for each succeeding unit to 
serve the claims mission more properly than the past. 
B. Countries With a Universal Legal System 
An even more effective system is possible when the host nation 
utilizes a universal and uniform legal system.
132
 For these situations, 
 
 131. The BJAMP already emphasizes the importance of continually updating the material it 
teaches to reflect current conditions in the countries where the United States is at war. PDP 
FAQ, supra note 78. In the BJAMP program, recently redeployed personnel may come to the 
conference, and currently deployed claims commissioners may share their experiences through 
video-teleconferencing. Id. 
 Additionally, the military has a program in place, the After Action Review (AAR), that is 
designed to help soldiers learn from past experiences. An AAR is ―a professional discussion of 
an event, focused on performance standards, that enables soldiers to discover for themselves 
what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve on weaknesses. It is 
a tool leaders and units can use to get maximum benefit from every mission or task.‖ After 
Action Review, AIR UNIV., http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army/tc_25-20/chap1.htm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2012).  
 132. While this proposal refers to a ―nation,‖ it could also mean a culture (e.g., Shiite 
religion). Further, if there is a particular group of countries that share a similar legal system, the 
proposal could apply to the entire group of countries. The proposal does not seek to create costs 
when a more efficient alternative is available. Thus, if there are only slightly nuanced 
differences between the laws, it would probably be wiser to use parts of both proposals. To 
illustrate: if all of Europe (I use Europe for simplicity purposes) had similar laws, then a 
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the Department of Defense, or a similar institution, could assemble a 
think tank similar to the one discussed in the previous proposal. 
However, more resources could be devoted here because it would 
cover an entire nation‘s or culture‘s laws and customs as opposed to 
one discrete region or tribe. The think tank could produce the 
equivalent of a hornbook or primer explaining liability and damage 
issues in the host nation.
133
 Ideally, for future U.S. conflicts, the think 
tank would be established before troops ever enter the country. 
However, establishing a think tank can still be effective even in 
ongoing situations like, for example, Iraq. The think tank would 
essentially compile a set of guidelines in accordance with both the 
law and custom of the host nation as well as detail potential scenarios 
and the appropriate remedies of frequently arising foreign claims.
134
 
These guidelines could be useful for claims commissioners to review 
when assessing the viability of a foreign claim. Moreover, such a 
system would help claims commissioners avoid the types of problems 
 
compilation of laws could be created for Europe. Then, once a claims commissioner deployed 
to a specific region in Europe, he could visit a leader of that region to discuss which laws fit and 
what should be amended, added, or subtracted.  
 133. This could be conducted in much the same process that occurs when each department 
of the government creates regulations, field manuals, and pamphlets. See U.S. DEP‘T OF THE 
ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 25–0, THE ARMY PUBLISHING PROGRAM (2008), for information 
on how the Army creates and publishes its publications and forms. 
 134. This part of the proposal assumes that the United States only recognizes one type of 
law within the country. For example, when the United States arrived on the Haitian shores to 
provide disaster relief for the 2010 earthquake, there was no dispute as to what type of law the 
Haitians follow. Telephone Interview with Foreign Torts Branch, supra note 72. Consequently, 
compiling a fixed set of laws for regions like Haiti would be comparatively simple. However, 
when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, it faced a different situation. Id. The Iraqis were 
dealing with numerous types of law—its own cultural laws (separated by, for example, the 
Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds); the residual laws from the Saddam Hussein regime; and the new 
laws that the United States was trying to implement in conjunction with the new Iraqi 
government. Id. 
 This potential for different types of laws does not conflict with this proposal; instead, this 
solution merely proposes that the military institutes a policy to ensure that regardless of the law 
the claims commissioners decide to incorporate into the adjudication of claims, that it be the 
law that is incorporated consistently and not vary from one deployment to the next.  
 Additionally, whenever a proposed think tank is organized, that group could consult with 
the military and determine what type of legal code would be most appropriate to incorporate 
into the claims adjudication process. Upon determining this, the think tank could then decide on 
the correct laws. 
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that occurred in the past when local law and custom was applied with 
uncertainty in the adjudication of foreign claims.
135
  
The International Legal Foundation (ILF) has already created 
something resembling this approach for its criminal defense 
attorneys.
136
 The report, The Customary Laws of Afghanistan, is 
divided into four geographical regions of Afghanistan.
137
 While the 
report focuses on criminal violations, it provides proof that such 
reports can be written, even about countries that have no universal 
legal system.
138
 Furthermore, the report provides a template for how 
the military think tank could structure its own report to be more 
specific to foreign claims. It is a simple, easy-to-read-and-reference 
sixty-four-page document.
139
 Creating a similar document would 
make it much more likely that claims commissioners would know the 
correct local law and custom when adjudicating foreign claims and be 
able to apply it properly.
140
 Additionally, the ILF report was created 
by a single Afghan professor;
141
 surely the United States has the 
resources to assemble a team of individuals who could create a 
similar primer for claims commissioners. 
CONCLUSION 
It is time to implement a program that will standardize the 
application of the local law and custom in foreign claims 
adjudication. Without a uniform program, claims commissioners will 
continue to either utilize ad hoc techniques that fall short of the 
intentions of the FCA or apply local laws incorrectly or 
inconsistently. Because of the relatively recent emergence of the 
counterinsurgency doctrine, there has never been a more important 
 
 135. See LEGAL LESSONS VOL. II, supra note 100, at 187. 
 136. See INT‘L LEGAL FOUND., supra note 2.  
 137. Id. at 2–3. 
 138. Id. at 4. 
 139. Id. at 1.  
 140. While this proposed methodology involving a report would be easier to create for an 
entire nation, it also could be used for individual regions—similar to what the ILF did in its 
report. Thus, this methodology could technically be a solution for countries with a universal 
legal system as well as those without. However, it is likely not as effective or efficient a 
strategy for countries that have multiple regions because of the substantial variables of the law 
and custom within each discrete region.  
 141. See INT‘L LEGAL FOUND., supra note 2, at 4.  
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time in American warfare history to adapt U.S. policy to the local law 
and custom of the host nation. The programs this Note recommends 
will better ensure that the FCA‘s purpose is effectuated, thus 
resulting in happier claimants and a stronger fulfillment of the U.S. 
war strategy. 
AFTERWORD
142
 
Before the claims commissioner finalized his investigation 
regarding Shabbir‘s claim, he reviewed the database that addressed 
laws within the Khost province. The claims commissioner read a 
short paragraph discussing the killing of dogs in that culture. After 
consulting the database he realized that he needed to pay Shabbir a 
higher amount than what he had originally estimated. The guideline 
explained that Khost local custom mandated that when a person kills 
a dog, he has to pay more than what it would cost to simply replace 
it.
143
 Armed with this new information, the claims commissioner 
nearly tripled the amount he was originally going to pay Shabbir. The 
claims commissioner also explained to Shabbir why he was paying 
him such a large amount of money. 
Shabbir returned to his village and spread the word that the United 
States had treated him well. Furthermore, Shabbir expressed his joy 
and encouragement that the claims commissioner had understood his 
people‘s custom. Shabbir made it a point to express his enthusiasm to 
the village elder, who was also impressed with the claims 
commissioner‘s actions. As a result, he decided that his village would 
consider providing the United States with the intelligence information 
that the nearby military unit had requested when its convoy traveled 
there only a few days prior. 
 
 142. This is intended to be an alternative ending to the preface. It assumes that the claims 
commissioner is implementing the database I proposed for nations without a universal legal 
system.  
 143. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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